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INTRODUCTION 
In Jane Austen’s novel Sense and Sensibility, Mr. Henry Dashwood 
leaves his entire estate to his son, John, and on his deathbed, he elicits 
a promise that John will provide comfortably for his stepmother and his 
three half-sisters, Elinor, Marianne, and Margaret. In the flush of his 
new wealth, John thinks he should settle £1000 on each of his sisters. 
But as soon as John mentions it to his wife, Fanny, she convinces him, 
through impeccable logic, that Mr. Dashwood certainly didn’t intend 
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that John would actually give his half-sisters any money; surely all the 
money he inherited was necessary to provide comfortably for their own 
son Harry. Better, John would be doing his father’s bidding by helping 
them move to a small house, sending some fish and game when the 
season was right, and perhaps making a little present of furniture now 
and then. With his wife’s help, John Dashwood saved himself £3000 per 
year and any guilt from failing to honor his father’s deathbed wishes. As 
Fanny explained, 
Altogether, they will have five hundred a-year amongst them, 
and what on earth can four women want for more than that?—
They will live so cheap! Their housekeeping will be nothing at 
all. They will have no carriage, no horses, and hardly any 
servants; they will keep no company, and can have no expenses 
of any kind! Only conceive how comfortable they will be! Five 
hundred a year! I am sure I cannot imagine how they will spend 
half of it; and as to your giving them more, it is quite absurd to 
think of it. They will be much more able to give you something.1 
Unfortunately for the girls, on his deathbed Mr. Dashwood had placed 
too much faith in John’s oral promise to care for them. Next, the widow 
and her three daughters are walking out the gates of the only home they 
had known for their new life of poverty just as John, Fanny, and Harry 
are driving their carriages into the family estate. The dynamics of wealth 
have changed very little since Jane Austen’s day, as the wealthy are able 
to pass on their wealth to build more wealth, while those with little 
wealth scrimp and save for a lifetime only to see their meager 
inheritances often lost through transfers to the next generation.2 
 
 1 JANE AUSTEN, SENSE AND SENSIBILITY 18-19 (Little, Brown & Co. 1910) (1811). 
 2 See William R. Emmons et al., The Financial Returns from College Across 
Generations: Large but Unequal, in DEMOGRAPHICS OF WEALTH (2018 SERIES) 1, 5 (2018) 
(identifying the “head-start effect” and noting that “[w]hatever a family head’s 
education level, being non-Hispanic white, being over 40 and/or having college-
educated parents typically boosts income and wealth compared to families without 
these demographic characteristics (singly or in combination). The median college 
graduate family with all of the most advantageous inherited demographics — white, 
aged 40-61, college grad parents — had three times as much income and six times as 
much wealth as the median family overall”); Ray Boshara, Born on 3rd Base? The Effects 
of Head Starts and College on Family Wealth, FED. RES. BANK ST. LOUIS (Apr. 17, 2018), 
https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2018/april/born-third-base-effect-head-
starts-college-family-wealth [https://perma.cc/Z83W-QLMR]; Laura Feiveson & John 
Sabelhaus, How Does Intergenerational Wealth Transmission Affect Wealth 
Concentration? , FED. RES. SYS.: FEDS NOTES (June 1, 2018), https://www.federalreserve. 
gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/how-does-intergenerational-wealth-transmission-affect-
wealth-concentration-20180601.htm [https://perma.cc/G9N8-2DVN] (exploring how the 
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We all know that those with wealth are better situated to maintain 
and grow that wealth than those without.3 The adage that it takes money 
to make money is more true today than in nearly a century.4 We also 
know that the tax and probate laws help those with wealth keep it by 
giving breaks on transfer taxes, capital gains taxes, and even mortgage 
deductions that the person of modest means can hardly imagine.5 A 
major tool for growing wealth in high-wealth families is careful estate 
planning that protects assets from dissipation by spendthrift 
beneficiaries and channels control over wealth to those who will focus 
on maintenance rather than utilization.6 Much of the high-wealth 
exceptionalism, as Professor Allison Tait refers to it, is a result of 
favorable laws allowing wealthy families to manage their wealth 
through a completely independent financial system, far away from the 
prying eyes of the tax commissioner, the securities regulator, and even 
 
bulk of inheritances and inter vivos gifts flow to families that already have substantial 
resources). 
 3 See, e.g., THOMAS M. SHAPIRO, THE HIDDEN COST OF BEING AFRICAN AMERICAN: HOW 
WEALTH PERPETUATES INEQUALITY 4-5 (Oxford Univ. Press 2004) (arguing that wealth 
and inheritance play a role in economic inequality); Thomas W. Mitchell, Growing 
Inequality and Racial Economic Gaps, 56 HOW. L.J. 849, 850-52 (2013) (arguing that 
changes to public policy must be made to reduce economic inequality); Beverly Moran 
& Stephanie M. Wildman, Race and Wealth Disparity: The Role of Law and the Legal 
System, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1219, 1219-21 (2007) (discussing how the U.S. legal 
system creates and maintains wealth disparity based on race); Daria Roithmayr, Them 
That Has, Gets, 27 MISS. C.L. REV. 373, 374-75 (2008) (discussing how “positive 
feedback loops” in social institutions play a role in racial and economic inequality). 
 4 See Carla Spivack, Broken Links: A Critique of Formal Equality in Inheritance Law, 
2019 WIS. L. REV. 191, 194-96 (2019); Raj Chetty et al., Where is the Land of 
Opportunity? The Geography of Intergenerational Mobility in the United States 1-5 (Nat’l 
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19843, 2014), https://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w19843 [https://perma.cc/6MEK-CXKV]; V. Joseph Hotz et al., The Role of 
Parental Wealth and Income in Financing Children’s College Attendance and its 
Consequences 1-5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 25144, 2018), 
https://www.nber.org/papers/w25144 [https://perma.cc/5U6L-RNWW]; Boshara, supra 
note 2. 
 5 Felix B. Chang, Asymmetries in the Generation and Transmission of Wealth, 79 
OHIO ST. L.J. 73, 81-86 (2018); see Naomi Cahn, Dismantling the Trusts and Estates 
Canon, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 165, 175-76 (2019) [hereinafter Dismantling Trusts] 
(explaining how trusts and estates law is generally focused on advancing the interests 
of the wealthy). 
 6 Chang, supra note 5, at 76-77, 99-100; see also Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel 
Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since 1913: Evidence from Capitalized 
Income Tax Data, 131 Q.J. ECON. 519, 563-65 (2016); Daniel J. Amato, Note, The Good, 
the Bad, and the Ugly: The Political Economy and Unintended Consequences of Perpetual 
Trusts, 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 637, 646 (2013); Feiveson & Sabelhaus, supra note 2. 
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the courts as they establish family foundations, family offices, and 
family constitutions solely to maintain and grow their wealth.7 
But for the rest of us in the 99%,8 we generally work hard most of our 
lives trying to raise our kids, put them through college, get them 
established, and then hopefully save enough for a modest retirement. 
And for well over 50% of the population, these goals are completely 
unattainable. Counting debt, the net wealth of the bottom 50% is $0.9 
Most people will die with no or such small estates, which are likely to 
be so fractionated when they pass at death, that the heirs or beneficiaries 
take inheritances that are perhaps able to pay off some credit card debt, 
but are certainly not enough to make a down payment on a house or 
put a child through college. Unfortunately for the bottom half of the 
population, the probate and succession laws are not set up to help 
maintain and grow wealth, but in fact contribute to dissipation and loss 
of wealth at each generation.10  
Studies have shown that intergenerational wealth transmission 
significantly affects wealth concentration and the growing wealth gap.11 
Of the two million households that received an inheritance or a 
substantial inter vivos gift each year, roughly half are small, under 
$50,000, while transfers of $1 million or more account for only 2% of 
the transfers. Yet, those 2% of inheritances over $1 million comprise 
40% of total wealth transferred.12 As scholars continue to examine the 
role of inheritance in the alarming wealth gap, few are focusing on how 
the laws of intestacy might exacerbate the gap by leading to greater 
wealth loss for the bottom half.13 In this study, I explore what happens 
to the family home, usually the largest single-value asset of those in the 
bottom 90%. The data, from 225 testate and intestate estates, are 
 
 7 Allison Anna Tait, The Law of High-Wealth Exceptionalism, 71 ALA. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 5) (available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3406070 [https://perma.cc/KU62-RD4N]). 
 8 It is actually the 99.9%, as the top 0.1% controls significant amounts of wealth. 
Between 1986 and 2012, almost half of U.S. wealth accumulation benefitted the top 
0.1%. Saez & Zucman, supra note 6, at 521. 
 9 Wealth Distribution in the United States in 2016, STATISTA, 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/203961/wealth-distribution-for-the-us/ (last visited 
Jan. 30, 2020) [https://perma.cc/P8CG-DV8Z]. 
 10 See Spivack, supra note 4, at 202-07; Chang, supra note 5, at 94-98. 
 11 See, e.g., Chang, supra note 5, at 83-86; Laurence J. Kotlikoff & Lawrence H. 
Summers, The Role of Intergenerational Transfers in Aggregate Capital Accumulation, 89 
J. POL. ECON. 706, 730 (1981). 
 12 Feiveson & Sabelhaus, supra note 2. 
 13 See Spivack, supra note 4, at 194-95 (discussing the link between inheritance laws 
and inequality). 
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sobering, as the lower-value homes of the intestate decedents are 
significantly more likely to be sold at below fair market value or lost to 
foreclosure or tax sale. And if they aren’t, they are likely to be 
partitioned into smaller shares for recipients who seem less able to 
leverage their inheritances into building their own wealth. Through an 
analysis of the real property assets of these decedents, we can see in 
vivid detail how wealth is lost for some families and how it is gained for 
others. 
I. THE WEALTH GAP, INHERITANCE, AND REAL PROPERTY 
Even as the income gap between different demographics has 
narrowed, the wealth gap has grown in ways that are quite alarming. In 
the United States, over 75% of wealth is controlled by the top 10% of 
the population.14 The top 0.1% controls 22% of average wealth.15 The 
wealth of the typical Black or Latino family is between 10-20% of the 
wealth of a typical white family.16 The 2008 recession hit Black and 
Latino family households much harder than white families. Between 
2005 and 2009, median white household net worth declined by 16% 
while Black and Hispanic households declined by 53% and 66% 
respectively.17 The gender wealth gap is also notable as women receive 
lower wages, take a greater hit to their earning potential by taking time 
off to care for children, parents, and spouses, and may be more risk 
averse in their investment strategies.18 Some scholars estimate that U.S. 
wealth would decline by as much as 51% if inter-generational 
 
 14 Saez & Zucman, supra note 6, at 552; see also Erez Aloni, The Marital Wealth Gap, 
93 WASH. L. REV. 1, 9-11 (2018). 
 15 Saez & Zucman, supra note 6, at 552. 
 16 Roithmayr, supra note 3, at 381-82; see also Rakesh Kochhar & Anthony Cilluffo, 
How Wealth Inequality has Changed in the U.S. Since the Great Recession, by Race, 
Ethnicity and Income, PEW RES. CTR. (Nov. 1, 2017), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2017/11/01/how-wealth-inequality-has-changed-in-the-u-s-since-the-great-recession-
by-race-ethnicity-and-income/ [https://perma.cc/NVU8-2JE2]; Rakesh Kochhar & 
Anthony Cilluffo, Key Findings on the Rise in Income Inequality Within America’s Racial 
and Ethnic Groups, PEW RES. CTR. (July 12, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2018/07/12/key-findings-on-the-rise-in-income-inequality-within-americas-
racial-and-ethnic-groups/ [https://perma.cc/7M32-YTAA]. 
 17 Mitchell, supra note 3, at 859-60.  
 18 Reshma Kapadia, The Stubborn Wealth Gap Between Men and Women, BARRON’S 
(Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/the-stubborn-wealth-gap-between-
men-and-women-1524099601 [https://perma.cc/77DD-SSHU]; see Gwendolyn Griffith, 
The Evolution of Women’s Wealth: Implications for Wealth Planners, ESTATE PLANNING 
CLIENT STRATEGIES (2014), 2014 WL 4160088, at *7. 
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inheritances were eliminated.19 And although there are many reasons 
for the wealth gap, from income inequality, racism, housing 
segregation, and tax policy, to risk-averse tendencies and lack of 
education about how to protect and grow wealth, intergenerational 
wealth transfers permissible by succession laws certainly contribute to 
the divide.20 While trust law enables some to shelter wealth from 
consumption and taxes, intestacy law contributes to dissipation 
through fractionation and administrative costs.21 And time exacerbates 
the wealth gap if parental wealth and behavior create positive feedback 
loops for white or male wealth, and negative feedback loops for Black 
and Hispanic or female wealth. 
Scholars have argued that two of the main factors in the widening 
wealth gap are the effects of intergenerational wealth transfers through 
inheritance and homeownership.22 As Lynnise Phillips Pantin explains: 
Fifty years after the Civil Rights Movement, the wealth gap is 
widening. The enormous growth is due in large part to the 
effects of intergenerational wealth transfers and 
homeownership. Wealth and real property, unlike income, 
accumulates in value and may be passed from generation to 
generation. Wealth transfers between generations contribute to 
the modern wealth gap because wealthy parents and 
grandparents can pass their wealth on to children and 
grandchildren through inheritance. Black families have lower 
wealth levels than White families. In a joint report, the Institute 
for Policy Studies and the Corporation for Economic 
Development, found that over the last thirty years the average 
wealth of White families had grown by eighty-four percent, 1.2 
times the rate of growth for the Latino population and three 
times the rate of growth for the Black population. Twenty 
percent of wealth can be attributed to formal and informal gifts 
 
 19 See Feiveson & Sabelhaus, supra note 2 (estimating that intergenerational 
transfers account for 26% of total wealth and then applying a real interest rate of 5%). 
See generally Kotlikoff & Summers, supra note 11, at 730 (“Intergenerational transfers 
appear to be the major element determining wealth accumulation in the United 
States.”).  
 20 See Feiveson & Sabelhaus, supra note 2; see also Cahn, supra note 5, at 175-78; 
Chang, supra note 5, at 75; Spivack, supra note 4, at 194-95. 
 21 See, e.g., Palma Joy Strand, Inheriting Inequality: Wealth, Race, and the Laws of 
Succession, 89 OR. L. REV. 453, 494-95 (2010); Amato, supra note 6, at 638-41. 
 22 A college education is also a key indicator of wealth accumulation. See The Rising 
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from family members. Moreover, wealthier parents have access 
to better communities, better schools, and richer social 
networks, which can lead in turn to their children building 
more wealth than children lacking these advantages. White 
Americans are more likely to receive an inheritance than Black 
Americans. 
Despite the collapse of the housing market during the Great 
Recession, homeownership is still the greatest source of wealth 
in the United States. Black homeownership lags behind White 
homeownership. Only forty-one percent of Black Americans 
own their homes, compared with seventy-one percent of White 
Americans. Black Americans not only build less wealth through 
a low rate of homeownership, but home values in segregated 
communities of color are lower than in those of White 
communities, resulting in Black homeowners earning a smaller 
return on their investment. Further, because they are less likely 
to inherit money or receive financial assistance from their 
families, it takes Black people longer to buy homes, and they 
also have smaller down payments than their White 
counterparts.23  
While there are many ways we could address the widening wealth gap 
through tax, trust law, housing, zoning, education, and other policies 
— and we should do so — we should also examine whether our probate 
and succession laws are exacerbating the problem and, if so, whether 
they are amenable to change. For many people of modest wealth, death 
and tax time are the only moments when they interact with a legal 
system that could potentially assist them in protecting their wealth. In 
fact, if probate courts were more like family-law courts, assisting with 
enforcement of child support payments and ensuring that the best 
interests of children are protected, the probate process could be an 
opportunity to do wealth planning that protects and salvages wealth 
from generation to generation rather than a risky period when it could 
just as easily be lost as not.  
In early modern England, the ecclesiastical courts managed probate 
of non-real property and, with the help of accountants and apparitors, 
ecclesiastical judges would preside over the succession of property with 
an eye toward avoiding the “utter undoing and spoyling of many 
 
 23 Lynnise E. Phillips Pantin, The Wealth Gap and the Racial Disparities in the Startup 
Ecosystem, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 419, 436-37 (2018) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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fatherlesse, and friendlesse children.”24 The process was much more 
hands-on by neighbors and court officials to ensure that the widow and 
the children would be as comfortable as possible.25 In today’s probate 
avoidance world, however, succession of property can be entirely in the 
shadows with no judicial oversight and no accounting, as all property 
can be set up to pass through non-probate will substitutes. This secrecy 
leaves many heirs to wonder if they are entitled to an inheritance, and 
often they do not even know to ask.26 
As we have moved to a more private process for property succession, 
a privacy sought out by the wealthy and exploited by people who want 
to keep those family skeletons in the closet, those who are most 
vulnerable to wealth dissipation are often forced into court-supervised 
probate with little likelihood of a good outcome. Without self-interested 
heirs and devisees willing to do the work of property administration, 
wealth can be easily lost or converted, and deserving beneficiaries are 
left with a distaste for the probate system that is exacerbated from 
generation to generation.27 Moreover, distaste for the probate system 
can also lead to skepticism or downright hostility to lawyers and the 
seemingly needless cost of estate planning. But lack of planning leaves 
many at the bottom of the economic spectrum forced into probate and 
application of the default rules of intestacy. 
Although intestate distribution schemes are intended to replicate the 
most likely intentions of decedents, they use a very broad brush to 
distribute property in families that may have unique needs and 
circumstances.28 Intestacy is not a good estate plan for a variety of 
reasons, not least of which is the likelihood of fractionation, partition, 
or sale that results from intestate properties passing to multiple heirs.29 
 
 24 AMY LOUISE ERICKSON, WOMEN AND PROPERTY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 37 
(1993) (quoting HENRY SWINBURNE, A TREATISE OF TESTAMENTS AND LAST WILLS (1590)). 
 25 See id. at 33, 35-36. 
 26 See Naomi Cahn & Amy Ziettlow, “Making Things Fair”: An Empirical Study of 
How People Approach the Wealth Transmission System, 22 ELDER L.J. 325, 328-30 (2015). 
 27 See id. at 331-32 (arguing that the private ordering of the wealth transfer process 
should evolve to reflect the needs of diverse twenty-first century families). 
 28 In a study of nearly 500 wills, most deviated from the default rules of intestate 
succession by leaving children unequal shares. See Danaya C. Wright & Beth Sterner, 
Honoring Probable Intent in Intestacy: An Empirical Assessment of the Default Rules and the 
Modern Family, 42 ACTEC L.J. 341, 368, 377 (2017). 
 29 See Spivack, supra note 4, at 202-07; see also Partition of Heirs Property Act, UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey= 
50724584-e808-4255-bc5d-8ea4e588371d (last visited Feb. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ 
K52A-7XL2] (listing status of state legislation related to the Uniform Partition of Heirs 
Property Act). 
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Lack of estate planning leaves property vulnerable during a perhaps 
lengthy period of incapacity, and probate involves administrative costs 
and delays in settling property or retitling it. These delays can lead to 
deterioration, loss of real property through tax sales and foreclosures, 
and the disappearance of movable property. Intestacy also cannot be 
fine-tuned to provide for the neediest heirs or those who helped out in 
old age by providing unequal shares or by giving different whole items 
of property to different heirs. And, of course, if a decedent has not 
created an estate plan, she cannot name a preferred personal 
representative who will be fair and efficient in administering the 
estate.30 
There is no question that planning for the succession of one’s 
property can help avoid the potential for wealth dissipation by putting 
it into a trust, imposing limits on access for spendthrift descendants, 
and using mechanisms that avoid the costs and delays of probate.31 For 
the very wealthy, a trust also can help minimize transfer taxes.32 But 
even for the rest of us, avoiding probate alone can help preserve wealth 
by titling property so that it passes quickly and easily to the beneficiary, 
without delays that can lead to its deterioration.33 And planning ahead 
so that assets don’t have to be sold quickly in order to pay fractional 
shares can also help. Although parents rarely want to treat their children 
unequally, it may be better for their estates if they give the house to one 
child, rather than split the assets equally in a way that is going to require 
 
 30 The majority of people appoint family members to be personal representatives of 
their estates. See Reid Kress Weisbord, Fiduciary Authority and Liability in Probate 
Estates: An Empirical Analysis, 53 UC DAVIS L. REV. 2561, 2589 (2020). The vast majority 
accept the appointment. See id. at 2590. The ability to choose the family member who 
will be the most responsible is vitally important if there are heirs or beneficiaries who 
will procrastinate and not administer the estate in a timely manner, or who will do so 
unevenly, and provide grounds for will challenges. See id. at 2589 (“The appointment 
of an estate fiduciary is arguably the most important administrative term in a will 
because . . . the position comes with great power and responsibility.”). 
 31 See Cahn, Dismantling Trusts, supra note 5, at 187-88; Amato, supra note 6, at 
666-70. 
 32 See Wendy C. Gerzog, Solutions to the Sexist QTIP Provisions, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. 
& TR. J. 97, 125 (2000); see also Thomas Piketty, Property, Inequality, and Taxation: 
Reflections on Capital in the Twenty-First Century, 68 TAX L. REV. 631, 631 (2015) 
(discussing optimal tax policy to combat wealth inequality). 
 33 Probate can be entirely avoided through the relatively simple use of transfer-on-
death beneficiary designations in life insurance, securities and bank accounts, and even 
for real property. See Danaya C. Wright, Beneficiary Deeds for Real Estate: Transfer-on-
Death, Lady Bird, and Enhanced Life Estate Deeds, in POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY (M.A. 
Wolf, ed.) (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 4) (on file with the author) [hereinafter 
Beneficiary Deeds]. 
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partition and/or sale.34 Where the family home is the largest single asset, 
people struggle with how to pass it to the next generation, usually 
accepting that it will be sold and the proceeds split equally. And this 
may be the best result for some families, especially if the kids are grown, 
have kids of their own, live afar, and already own their own homes. For 
those in the solid middle class, an inheritance from the sale of grandma’s 
house can easily be put into savings to be used for the grandkids’ college 
or to make a down payment on a home for a child moving into an 
expensive housing market.  
For those not in the middle class, however, grandma’s house might 
be put to better use if it was retained and rented out to generate an 
income stream.35 Or perhaps a child or grandchild who lives nearby 
could use it and thereby not have to pay rent. But property, especially 
real property, that passes through intestacy risks being fractionated and 
sold, often yielding a fairly small inheritance for heirs who could really 
use the boost of wealth at this point in their lives.36 For those who are 
struggling to get by, an inheritance may keep the creditors at bay, but it 
rarely provides enough to put away, invest, or save in order to begin 
building wealth, and when it is dissipated needlessly through the 
probate process, it is even less likely to provide that necessary nest egg.37 
All this is to say that people do not go into the probate process equally 
 
 34 See Spivack, supra note 4, at 204-07; see also Thomas W. Mitchell et al., Forced 
Sale Risk: Class, Race, and the “Double Discount,” 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 589, 591 (2010). 
 35 Of course, grandma cannot require that her successors not alienate the home, as 
that would be an unlawful restraint on alienation. But she could put it into a trust with 
an instruction that the house be used to generate income or provide a residence for 
family members as long as doing so is in the best interests of some subset of 
beneficiaries. That is certainly what wealthy families do, like the Kennedy and Bush 
families. See Jay Root, George P. Bush’s Secret Mansion Is Financed by an Undisclosed Loan 
from Texas Donor’s Bank, TEX. TRIB. (Feb. 16, 2018, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2018/02/16/george-p-bushs-secret-mansion-financed-
undisclosed-loan-texas-donor/ [https://perma.cc/4DVC-96DJ]; Carl O’Donnell, How 
The $1 Billion Kennedy Family Fortune Defies Death And Taxes, FORBES (Jul. 8, 2014, 9:45 
AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/carlodonnell/2014/07/08/how-the-1-billion-kennedy-
family-fortune-defies-death-and-taxes-3/#728d3d284e4a [https://perma.cc/LA6N-6VFV]. 
 36 See Feiveson & Sabelhaus, supra note 2, at tbl.1. As noted in the discussion of 
Table 4 infra, the median real property inheritance for intestate heirs was less than one-
third ($30,000) the real property inheritance for testate heirs ($100,000), which 
confirms Feiveson and Sabelhaus’s findings that most inheritances are less than 
$50,000. With intestate decedents being nearly twenty years younger than their testate 
counterparts, their heirs are going to be younger, and younger adults are less likely than 
older adults to have earned significant wealth. 
 37 Feiveson and Sabelhaus show that 56% of inherited wealth passes to recipients 
who are already in the top 10% of the population by wealth, while only 8% of inherited 
wealth passes to those in the bottom half. Id. at fig.5. 
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and they generally come out even more unequally. Thus, if we want to 
lessen the wealth gap, one focus should be on strategies to preserve 
wealth from generation to generation for lower-wealth families. Perhaps 
changes to the laws of intestacy as well as the probate process can also 
help. 
If studies are accurate that inheritances constitute as much as 50% of 
U.S. wealth, and that the family home is the largest single asset of most 
decedents, then examining what happens to the family home at the 
death of the homeowner can identify vectors of influence to reduce the 
dissipation of wealth that often occurs at death. To better understand 
how the rich get richer and the poor get poorer, I undertook an 
empirical study of testate and intestate estates probated in Alachua 
County, Florida, during the year 2013. And besides examining how the 
property was disposed of by the decedent and to whom,38 I also 
examined the real property records to see the value and the subsequent 
disposition of the home by the heirs and beneficiaries. Not surprisingly, 
the results showed that the testate estates had homes of significantly 
greater value that were likely to be retained or sold at or near the fair 
market value. The intestate estates had homes of far less value and were 
too frequently lost to tax sales or foreclosure or, if sold, were sold for 
well below the fair market value. This evidence suggests that we should 
look at possible legal and policy changes to help interrupt the 
downward wealth cycle for the families of poorer decedents by focusing 
on ways to protect real property assets. 
II. METHODOLOGY 
I began this study by collecting the death certificates, probate 
petitions, and wills and codicils of every person whose estate was 
probated in the year 2013 in Alachua County, Florida. Although 1,799 
people died in the county in that year,39 only 408 estates were probated, 
for a roughly 23% probate rate.40 For the other 1,391 people, we can 
never know exactly how much property they had or what happened to 
it. Hopefully, most of it passed through non-probate mechanisms, such 
 
 38 See Wright & Sterner, supra note 28, at 358-70. 
 39 Leading Causes of Death — 2013, FLA. DEP’T HEALTH, http://www. 
flhealthcharts.com/ChartsReports/rdPage.aspx?rdReport=ChartsProfiles.LeadingCauses 
OfDeathProfile (last visited Feb. 1, 2020) [https://perma.cc/YN4R-X9QY]. 
 40 These were all cases filed for probate in Alachua County during 2013. Of course, 
many of the cases filed for probate were of decedents who died in 2012 or even earlier. 
But the number of cases filed each year and the number of deaths are consistent enough 
to conclude that on average only about 25% of decedents leave wealth that requires 
probate. 
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as revocable trusts, joint tenancies, and transfer-on-death (“TOD”) or 
payable-on-death (“POD”) designations to the intended beneficiaries. 
Half of the decedents likely owned only tangible personal property that 
would have been distributed to next of kin by family and no probate 
process would have been necessary.41 Some of those people will have 
been out-of-state residents and their estates will have been probated in 
their county of domicile. But 408 people were domiciled in Alachua 
County at death and they owned some form of property titled solely in 
their own name that required court-supervised probate to facilitate its 
transfer to the appropriate taker. For many, this was a piece of real 
estate, most often the family home. For others, it was simply a bank 
account, a securities account without a beneficiary designation, and, in 
some cases, wrongful death proceeds. Although a dollar amount is 
provided by the personal representative for most estates being probated, 
that number was often significantly undervalued, as property that 
passes through a non-probate will substitute, and most tangible 
personal property, need not be probated at all. Nevertheless, there were 
some significant differences between the assets and demographics of the 
intestate decedents and the testate decedents. 
I have already reported on the dramatic wealth gap between the 
testate and intestate decedents.42 In my earlier study of 115 intestate 
decedents and 293 testate decedents, I found the following distinctions: 
• The median age of intestate decedents was sixty-five and the 
median age of testate decedents was eighty-four. 
• The median size estate of intestate decedents was $17,400 and 
the median size of testate decedents was $67,000.43 
• No intestate estate was over $1 million, but at least seven 
testate estates were worth more than $1 million. 
 
 41 See Wealth Distribution in the United States in 2016, supra note 9 (showing that 
the bottom 50% of the population owned 0% of wealth). 
 42 See Danaya C. Wright, Disrupting the Wealth Gap Cycles: An Empirical Study of 
Testacy and Wealth, 2019 WIS. L. REV. 295, 298 (2019) [hereinafter Disrupting]; Danaya 
C. Wright, The Demographics of Intergenerational Transmission of Wealth: An Empirical 
Study of Testacy and Intestacy on Family Property, 88 UMKC L. REV. (forthcoming 2020) 
(manuscript at 5-6) (on file with author) [hereinafter Demographics]. 
 43 This number is particularly squishy, as wealth passing through non-probate will 
substitutes do not need to be listed in probate proceedings, and in many cases the value 
of the homestead does not require disclosure as Florida authorizes homestead 
protections for the descent of homes of unlimited value. See Wright, Disrupting, supra 
note 42, at 305-08. 
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• Ten percent of intestate estates were valued at less than $500; 
no testate estate was valued that low. 
• In a county in which whites comprise only 61% of the 
population, 93% of testate decedents were white and 60% of 
the intestate decedents were white. 
• In a county in which Blacks comprise 20% of the population, 
4% of the testate decedents were Black and 32% of the 
intestate decedents were Black. 
• The mean wealth of white testate decedents was $191,043 and 
the mean wealth of Black testate decedents was $76,460. 
• The mean wealth of white intestate decedents was $59,954 
and the mean wealth of Black intestate decedents was 
$32,536. 
• Testate decedents were 57% female and 43% male; intestate 
decedents were 42% female and 58% male. 
• The mean wealth of testate male decedents was $279,874 and 
the mean wealth of testate female decedents was $112,421. 
• The mean wealth of intestate male decedents was $55,813 and 
the mean wealth of intestate female decedents was $61,393. 
• Married white testate men had more overall wealth, average 
wealth, and median wealth than any other category of 
decedents, married, single, divorced, or never married. 
These statistics offer stark evidence that race, sex, marital status, and 
age correlate with higher and lower levels of wealth, and for somewhat 
obvious reasons. White men clearly have more wealth overall, on 
average, than white women or Black men or women.44 Men have more 
wealth overall than women, notwithstanding that testate women 
comprised the largest single group of decedents in the data set.45  
There were far more nuances to the data than I have summarized 
here.46 The goal in my earlier work has been to identify as much 
information as I can about the identity and behavior of testate decedents 
and the identity and behavior of intestate decedents to identify the 
 
 44 See id. at 316-20. 
 45 Id. at 316. 
 46 This data is more fully explored in Wright, Demographics, supra note 42 
(manuscript at 40-47). 
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population most in need of estate-planning services. Many of the 
intestate decedents died unexpectedly, through accidents or sudden 
medical emergencies. Three of my intestate decedents were under the 
age of ten, and ten intestate decedents were under the age of thirty-five. 
No testate decedents were under the age of thirty-five. Half of the testate 
decedents were over the age of eighty-five while only 16% of the 
intestate decedents were over the age of eighty-five. Collectively, the set 
of testate decedents were quite elderly (over age seventy-five), white, 
and more often female. The intestate decedents were much younger, 
with the majority in the forty-five to sixty-five age range, and more often 
male. And although a majority were white, there was a far greater 
percentage of Black decedents than are represented in the population as 
a whole. The intestate decedents also held far less wealth than the testate 
decedents, which is compounded by the likelihood that the testate 
decedents had significantly more unreported wealth passing through 
will substitutes than the intestate decedents.47 
But why do these differences matter? Intestacy is the succession plan 
that we have assumed for centuries reflects the most likely intent of a 
majority of people. Under most intestacy rules, the surviving spouse is 
entitled to at least half and often the entirety of the decedent’s estate.48 
What is left passes equally to the children and grandchildren.49 If there 
is no surviving spouse or descendants, the estate passes to siblings, 
aunts and uncles, cousins, and then eventually to the state if there are 
no kin within the required degree of relationship.50 And not 
surprisingly, I found that a majority of the testate decedents left their 
property (a) to their surviving spouse if he or she survived and, if not, 
then to the children equally or (b) to the children equally.51 So we 
cannot assume that intestate dispositions are inherently undesirable if 
most testate decedents are following the same patterns.52 
 
 47 As discussed more fully below, many people will have wealth that passes through 
a non-probate will substitute, like a joint tenancy, a trust, life insurance, or an account 
with a beneficiary designation. This wealth need not be disclosed and, in general, the 
more wealthy decedents are likely to have had more undisclosed wealth pass through 
these mechanisms than the less wealthy decedents. See discussion infra Table 6. 
 48 UNIF. PROB. CODE § 2-102 (amended 2010). Although many states have not 
adopted the Uniform Probate Code, it is representative of the vast majority of intestacy 
provisions in the different states, and I cite to it here rather than give a handful of 
random state statutes. 
 49 Id. § 2-103. 
 50 Id.; id. § 2-105. 
 51 See Wright & Sterner, supra note 28, at 361-62. 
 52 This is not to say that the intestate priorities represent probable intent beyond 
the spouse and descendants. See Mary Louise Fellows & E. Gary Spitko, How Should 
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Yet simply having the real property pass through court-supervised 
probate is certainly a burden if probate takes time and resources away 
from the heirs who cannot afford to hire a lawyer and the delay means 
the real property cannot be listed and sold, or that mortgage payments 
are not being made and the house enters foreclosure. Unfortunately for 
many heirs, the reason for having to go through court-supervised 
probate is because the decedent owned real property that was not held 
in a joint tenancy, a trust, or with a TOD designation that would allow 
it to pass outside probate to successors.53 In my study, 96% of the 
intestate decedents whose homes were later sold by the heirs held real 
property that had to be probated, compared to 71% of the testate 
decedents whose homes were later sold and for which probate was 
necessary because of the presence of real property in the estate.54 Had 
the decedents done some basic estate planning to permit their homes to 
pass smoothly to successors, roughly 50% of the intestate decedents 
could have avoided probate altogether, as the real property was the only 
asset being probated. On the other hand, only 9% of testate decedents 
listed only real property in their petitions as the cause for initiating 
probate.55 The other 91% of the testate decedents had other assets that 
also required probate. Thus, providing a simple, non-probate 
mechanism to manage transfers of the decedents’ homes to heirs could 
have a tremendous and disproportionate benefit for intestate and lower 
wealth individuals. 
Moreover, just because testate decedents also leave their property in 
roughly equal shares to their children does not mean that the intestate 
rules cannot be improved upon. In particular, the problem of 
fractionation when there are multiple heirs means that many properties 
 
Non-Probate Transfers Matter in Intestacy? , 53 UC DAVIS L. REV. 2207, 2216 (2020). 
When decedents do not have descendants they leave their property in wildly different 
ways. See, e.g., Russell N. James III, The Emerging Potential of Longitudinal Empirical 
Research in Estate Planning: Examples from Charitable Bequests, 53 UC DAVIS L. REV. 
2397, 2415 (2020) (documenting “that having children is associated with a significant 
decrease in the probability of having a charitable estate plan”). 
 53 A little over half of all states have a mechanism to allow for a beneficiary 
designation on real property, either through the Uniform Real Property Transfer on 
Death Act, their own TOD deed statutes, or through the use of enhanced life estates. 
See Wright, Beneficiary Deeds, supra note 33 (manuscript at 2-3). 
 54 See discussion infra Table 6. 
 55 These are the numbers only for the testate and intestate decedents who owned 
real property before death and which property was later sold by the heirs. More than 
half of the testate real property and almost half of the intestate real property was either 
retained by successors or foreclosed upon, and many of those did not require probate if 
the successor was the surviving spouse and the home was held in joint tenancy or 
tenancy by the entirety. See infra Table 6. 
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may have to be sold and the proceeds split to pay legacies for all the 
children.56 When that happens, heirs who are less financially stable may 
be forced to sell immediately even though the market might not be 
right.57 Less financially stable heirs are also less likely to be able to 
modernize the property in anticipation of a higher sales price than heirs 
who are more financially stable. Some heirs may insist on selling the 
property immediately, while others might want to rent the property and 
receive an income stream. But renting requires maintenance and 
supervision, which many heirs might not be able to provide, especially 
if they live afar. Studies show that sales as a result of forced partition 
yield well-below fair market value compared to homes sold voluntarily 
by the homeowner.58 So if we assume that the heirs of the less-wealthy 
intestate decedents are likely to be less financially stable than the heirs 
of the wealthier testate decedents, the former are less likely to be able 
to leverage their inheritances to produce more wealth or to even retain 
what their parents may have worked so hard to acquire. Furthermore, 
when we examine the real property owned by the intestate decedents, 
we not surprisingly find that it was generally worth less, was located in 
less desirable neighborhoods, and was often sold at significantly below 
the fair market value.59 
By examining the real property records of the testate and intestate 
decedents we can see vividly how the wealth cycle works for the wealthy 
and fails for the generally poorer intestate decedents. Although there 
were well-to-do intestate decedents and poor testate decedents, a close 
examination of their real property holdings and subsequent disposition 
tells a very enlightening story about the wealth gap and cycles of 
poverty. 
 
 56 The fractionation problems are legion. When real property is fractionated 
through intestacy, many families are unable to afford the expense to retitle the property 
and, over time, title issues compound. As a result, the Uniform Law Commission has 
promulgated the Uniform Partition of Heirs Property Act to deal with this problem. As 
of February 1, 2020, it has been adopted in fifteen states and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 
Partition of Heirs Property Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, https://www.uniformlaws.org/ 
committees/community-home?CommunityKey=50724584-e808-4255-bc5d-8ea4e588 
371d [https://perma.cc/DA36-3FVK]; see also Joan Flocks et al., The Disproportionate 
Impact of Heirs’ Property in Florida’s Low-Income Communities of Color, 92 FLA. B.J. 57, 
57-58 (2018); Spivack, supra note 4, at 194-96. 
 57 See Mitchell et al., supra note 34, at 608-09. 
 58 Id. 
 59 See infra Table 4. 
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III. THE REAL PROPERTY DATA 
In this initial study, I examined the estate records of all 115 intestate 
decedents and 110 testate decedents to determine how many of them 
owned real property at death or shortly before death and what became 
of the homes after the homeowner died. Although not all of the 
decedents had their homes pass through probate because many held 
them in joint tenancy, tenancy by the entirety, or in a trust, they had 
owned them at death and their interests passed to successors. And a 
sizable number of homes were retained by surviving spouses and/or 
heirs, but by no means a majority.60 Even when a married couple owned 
a home, the survivor often sold it when the first spouse died. Thus, even 
if homes were held jointly so that the home itself did not have to pass 
through the probate process, many of these homes were disposed of 
shortly after the decedent’s death and could be located through a 
property records search.61 
When I found that a decedent had been on the title of real property, 
I examined the assessed value and the sales history from the point the 
decedent acquired the property until the present. I noted where the title 
was held in the name of the “heirs of XY,” which indicated that the heirs 
had not taken the steps to retitle the property in their own names, so it 
essentially remained in the name of the decedent’s estate. I noted those 
instances where the heirs had taken the trouble to transfer the title to 
their own names and then, in some instances, had quit claimed various 
shares to other heirs in an attempt to re-aggregate the property title in 
the name of one heir. I noted where the home had been held by the 
decedent and a spouse as joint tenants or tenants by the entirety, and 
the spouse continued to reside in the home. In one instance, the 
decedent had disposed of the property herself prior to death by 
transferring it to the persons who were also named as her will 
beneficiaries. But in the slight majority of situations, I found that the 
beneficiaries — either surviving spouse, children, parents, or even an 
 
 60 See infra Tables 2-3. 
 61 Property records are available on the Alachua County Property Appraiser’s 
Website. ALACHUA CTY. PROP. APPRAISER, https://www.acpafl.org/ (last visited Mar. 21, 
2020) [https://perma.cc/LLE6-LR3B]. Using addresses and names one can usually find 
the appropriate Tax ID Number. With that information, one can find recent sales data, 
and also navigate to the Clerk of the Court’s records for recorded mortgages and to the 
Tax Collector’s website for tax delinquencies. County Clerk Web Access, ALACHUA 
COUNTY, http://isol.alachuaclerk.org/RealEstate/SearchEntry.aspx (last visited Mar. 21, 
2020) [https://perma.cc/PU2L-MHCB]; Tax Collector, ALACHUA COUNTY, 
https://www.alachuacollector.com/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2020) [https://perma.cc/6WVL-
C2AU]. 
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ex-wife — had sold the real property within a few years of the testator’s 
death. I noted not only the sales price received from these sales, but also 
subsequent sales as my study spanned a period of volatile real property 
values and the home foreclosure crisis. And in a startling number of 
cases, banks and mortgage companies had been involved in subsequent 
transactions, some of which appeared to be foreclosures of homes that 
were under water, were unable to be sold by the beneficiaries and were 
simply released to the bank. In one case, a voluntary transfer was made 
to the bank by the surviving spouse to avoid foreclosure. In others, the 
bank forced a sale but ended up acquiring the property at significantly 
less than its fair market value. 
In the cases of the foreclosures and tax sales, I also examined the 
public records of the tax assessor to determine how long there had been 
defaults on payment of taxes, and the county clerk’s website to examine 
all mortgages filed against the properties. From these records I could 
usually surmise whether the home was foreclosed upon because it was 
underwater and could not be sold by the beneficiaries, or it was simply 
abandoned by the heirs and the bank sold it to pay what was, in some 
instances, a very small amount left on the mortgage. In these later 
instances, the heirs would have lost all equity in the home. A lengthy 
period of non-payment of property taxes could be attributed to financial 
woes or a lengthy period of incapacity on the part of the decedent, or 
neglect or financial instability on the part of the heirs after the 
decedent’s death. 
For all properties, I examined the popular real estate website Zillow 
to obtain a fair market value.62 Because these were 2019 values, they 
were likely to overstate the value of a home that might have been sold 
in 2013 or 2014, when real estate prices were somewhat more 
depressed. Thus, to obtain a more accurate value, I determined a fair 
market value by averaging the current value provided on Zillow, with 
the 2018 Total Just Value provided by the property assessor’s website. 
In all but one instance, the Zillow value was higher than the Total Just 
Value, and in most cases the latter value was roughly 80% of the Zillow 
value. By averaging the two numbers I obtained a value that seemed to 
be within range of the sales prices for many of the homes.  
During the period of my study, however, the median sales prices of 
homes in Alachua County increased by more than 25% between 2013 
and 2018, although most of that increase was in the years 2017 and 
2018 as the effects of the recession finally began to lift. To better reflect 
 
 62 ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/ 
M89S-3LBC]. 
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the economic circumstances under which most heirs were making 
decisions about selling these homes, I adjusted the fair market value, 
obtained by averaging the Zillow value with the Total Just Value, by 
multiplying that value by a percentage that reflected the increase in 
median home values in the county identified by Zillow. Table 1 below 
shows the Zillow Home Value Index and the Median Sales Price. I 
adjusted my fair market values for each home sold by the inflation 
adjustment percentage for the year sold. For instance, if a home was 
sold in 2013 and my average fair market value was $200,000, I 
multiplied that value by 0.71 to obtain an adjusted fair market value at 
the time of sale of $142,000. On the other hand, if the home was not 
sold until 2017, and its average fair market value was $200,000, I 
multiplied that value by 0.92 to obtain an adjusted fair market value at 
the time of sale of $184,000. 
Table 1. Inflation Adjustment Percentages 







January, 2012 $139,000 $123,000 72% 
January, 2013 $134,000 $129,000 75% 
January, 2014 $144,000 $120,000 70% 
January, 2015 $150,000 $134,000 78% 
January, 2016 $157,000 $146,000 85% 
January, 2017 $166,000 $169,000 99% 
January, 2018 $180,000 $171,000 100% 
Moreover, it is very difficult to find a true fair market value for all of 
these homes as some were located in neighborhoods that rebounded 
 
 63 Zillow Home Value Index for Alachua County, Florida. Alachua County Home 
Prices & Values, ZILLOW, https://www.zillow.com/alachua-county-fl/home-values/ (last 
visited Jan. 20, 2020) [https://perma.cc/URZ4-4BUU]. The Zillow Home Value Index is 
an estimate valuation for a given geographic area. 
 64 Id. In all years of my study except 2017, the median sales price was lower than 
the home value index, suggesting that lower end homes were selling better in Alachua 
County during those years than were predicted or than higher value homes.  
 65 If a home was sold in 2014, for instance, I multiplied the fair market value of the 
home by 0.70 to determine how much below or above the fair market value the home 
was sold for. 
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from the recession more quickly than other neighborhoods.66 Homes 
with special appeal or in preferred neighborhoods rebounded more 
quickly, but the real estate market in Alachua County has nearly 
reached its 2007 high. Thus, over time, some of the differences will have 
gradually evened out and, although none of these real estate values are 
perfect, they are reasonably close for a market that is notoriously 
uneven and difficult to gauge. And despite the tentative nature of the 
data, the results show pretty astounding differences between the testate 
and the intestate real properties that were sold. 
A. Testate and Intestate Real Property Records 
I examined the estates and property records of 110 testate decedents, 
of which twenty-nine held no apparent real property, forty-two held 
property that was later sold by surviving spouses and heirs, nineteen 
had held property that was retained by the spouse and continued to be 
utilized, thirteen had held property that was retained by the heirs, five 
held property that was transferred to a bank or mortgage company for 
value, and two had homes that were currently for sale.  
Table 2. Testate Estates with Real Property 
Testate Estates Number Percent of Total 
No Real Property 29 26 
Real Property 81 74 
Disposition Number 
Percent of Total Owning 
Real Property 
Sold 42 52 
Retained by Spouse 19 23 
Retained by Heirs 13 16 
Foreclosure 5 6 
For Sale 2 2 
 
 66 See Anthony Clark, Alachua County Zombie Subdivisions Slowly Coming Back to 
Life, GAINESVILLE SUN (Mar. 12, 2016, 4:10 PM), https://www.gainesville.com/ 
article/LK/20160312/news/604145280/GS/ [https://perma.cc/FC2N-MQ7L]; see also 
Fan Zhang, An Economic Impact Study of Historic Districts in Gainesville, Florida 
(2016) (unpublished MURP thesis, University of Florida) (on file with George A. 
Smathers Libraries, University of Florida), https://ufdc.ufl.edu/UFE0050755/00001 
[https://perma.cc/459L-XS2M] (finding that homes in historic districts in Gainesville 
retained their value better during the recession and rebounded more quickly than 
similar homes outside historic districts). 
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Because of the importance of these real property assets for successors, 
I focused especially on subsequent sales or losses of the homes through 
foreclosure, because homes still retained by survivors were clearly being 
utilized. Slightly over half of the testate homes (forty-two of eighty-one) 
were sold at some point after the death of the decedent, some as quickly 
as the same year of death, and one as late as fourteen years later.67 Most, 
however, were sold within five years of death, with the average time 
between death of the decedent and sale of the home being 3.3 years.68 
The median value of the testate home sales was $142,749 with the 
lowest being $5,800 and the highest being $745,254.69 This put them 
very close to the median home value for 2014, which is when many of 
these homes were sold. Only twelve homes (29%) were valued below 
$100,000. 
The intestate properties were quite different, however. Of the 115 
intestate decedents whose estates were probated, forty-eight had no 
apparent real property. Of the remaining sixty-seven, twenty-nine held 
real property that was sold, eleven held property retained by the spouse, 
seventeen held property retained by the heirs, and ten had homes that 
were lost to tax sale and foreclosure. 
Table 3. Intestate Estates with Real Property 
Intestate Estates Number Percent of Total 
No Real Property 48 42 
Real Property 67 59 
Disposition Number Percent of Total Owning 
l
Sold 2970 43 
Retained by Spouse 11 16 
Retained by Heirs 17 25 
Foreclosure/Tax Sale 10 15 
 
 67 It is likely that the probate was necessary because the heirs were finally deciding 
to sell the home and needed to clear the title. Presumably they were living in the home 
for the preceding fourteen years, or renting it and receiving an income stream. 
 68 See infra Table 5. 
 69 The average adjusted fair market value of the testate homes was $194,924, which 
showed significant skewing toward the higher end. 
 70 Of the twenty-nine intestate decedents who owned real property, I omitted three 
of them from my calculations because one owned a vacant lot, one owned commercial 
real estate, and one owned a duplex that was sold and torn down to build apartments, 
so the fair market value could not be easily determined. 
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And most notable was the value of these homes. They ranged in value 
from $3,500 (vacant lot) at the lowest to $15,450 for the lowest value 
home to $225,776 at the highest, with the median home value being 
$74,508. Sixteen of these homes (62%) were valued at under $100,000. 
The median home value of the intestate decedents was only 52% of the 
value of the median home value of the testate decedents. Of course, this 
is not particularly surprising, as people with more wealth are likely to 
have homes with higher values and are more likely to execute a will or 
engage in more robust estate planning than those with lower value 
property. But this is precisely where we should be concerned. To the 
extent lower- and working-class decedents were able to acquire real 
property, it is particularly important that that property not be lost as it 
passes from generation to generation where the importance of 
inheritances to building wealth is so crucial.  
When we think about the role of the family home in family stability, 
building wealth, and providing a firm step into the middle class, we 
should look critically at what happens to it throughout the succession 
process. From the point the decedent homeowner becomes 
incapacitated and perhaps has to move to hospice or a nursing home, 
through the court-supervised probate process, getting the home retitled 
in the name of the heirs, and then their decision to sell or retain it, the 
home goes through a very vulnerable period. If the home is retained by 
a surviving spouse or descendants, or it is sold quickly for substantial 
value and the heirs receive a decent inheritance, we can feel that the 
process is working. But if the home is lost to foreclosure or tax sale 
because of the homeowner’s lengthy period of incapacity, it is allowed 
to deteriorate and thus is sold for well below fair market value, or it is 
sold quickly to unload it by heirs who need to make a credit card 
payment, then there is a problem — a problem that is only exacerbated 
by the delays and costs of probate administration. And although I 
cannot get into the financial circumstances of every decedent and his or 
her heirs and devisees to understand the motives and pressures facing 
the survivors, I can analyze objectively what happened to the homes of 
these eighty-one testate and sixty-seven intestate decedents.71 
Of the 148 homes owned by decedents, 60 (32 testate and 28 intestate 
(40% of total)) were still owned by the children, spouses, or siblings in 
 
 71 Ultimately, out of 225 probated estates, 148 owned real property (81 testate 
decedents and 67 intestate decedents). See supra Tables 2-3. In all but two instances, 
the real property was a home. The other two were commercial properties that were 
difficult to value. A small number of decedents also owned additional real property, 
including beach condos, neighboring lots, and agricultural lands. I did not generally 
analyze what happened to these other real property assets. 
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2019, at least six years after probate and for some decedents as long as 
a decade after their death. Forty percent of these homes, therefore, 
continued to be utilized by heirs and beneficiaries and inured to their 
benefit, including providing homes or an income stream and ultimately 
preserving the decedent’s hard-earned equity. But sixty-eight homes 
(forty-two testate and twenty-six intestate (46% of total)) were sold and 
fifteen (five testate and ten intestate (10% of total)) were lost through 
foreclosure or tax sale, which were moments when wealth could be 
easily lost or leveraged depending on the unique characteristics of the 
property. 
B. Sales by Survivors 
Of the forty-two testate homes and twenty-six intestate homes that 
were sold by the heirs or beneficiaries after the death of the homeowner, 
the sales prices tell a sobering story. 
Table 4. Sales Prices as Compared to Fair Market Value (FMV) 






25% FMV or 
less72  
1 2% 1 4% 
25%<FMV<50%  1 2% 3 11% 
50%<FMV<75%  3 7% 6 22% 
75%<FMV<100%  12 29% 6 22% 
>100%  25 60% 11 41% 
Even when the homes were not lost to tax sale or foreclosure, the 
homes of intestate decedents were nearly four times more likely to be 
sold at less than 50% of fair market value than the homes of the testate 
decedents and three times more likely to be sold at below 75% of fair 
market value. For instance, only one testate home but four intestate 
homes were sold at below 30% of fair market value. Three of the four 
intestate homes were valued below $75,000, as was the one testate 
home, showing that lower value homes are more susceptible to a 
“succession discount.” This succession discount is apparent when these 
homes on the low side of the market are at risk for being sold for 
significantly below the adjusted fair market value (one for 12% and one 
 
 72 This represents the difference between the sales price and the adjusted fair market 
value at the time of sale for the twenty-six intestate homes and forty-two testate homes. 
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for 20%!); they also consequently yielded relatively small inheritances 
for the heirs/beneficiaries. 
On the other end of the economic spectrum, 89% of testate homes but 
only 63% of intestate homes were sold for 75% or higher of fair market 
value. Sliced a different way, only 44% of the intestate homes but 79% 
of testate homes were sold for 90% or higher of fair market value. The 
homes that sold for close to fair market value were mostly in the higher-
value range, with the average home value of these higher-grossing 
testate homes being $215,577 and the average value of the intestate 
homes being $84,601.73 
If we consider that lower home values and younger intestate heirs are 
a risky combination in which the heirs are likely to be less able to 
improve homes in order sell them at a fair price, or are in a hurry to sell 
because they are less financially secure, it is evident that the intestate 
heirs are less well-positioned to take advantage of their inheritances 
than their testate counterparts. The fact that over one-third of intestate 
homes but only 11% of testate are being sold for well below fair market 
value, and that the intestate homes are worth significantly less, suggests 
that the inheritances that these heirs and beneficiaries are likely to 
receive are going to be quite different. And that too is borne out by the 
data. I broke down each sale for each home by the number of heirs or 
devisees and found that the median real property inheritance from a 
testate decedent was $120,000 with $1,409 being the lowest and 
$527,500 being the highest. On the other hand, the median real 
property inheritance from an intestate decedent was $30,000, with $300 
being the lowest and $224,900 being the highest. Once again, we are 
looking at testate beneficiaries receiving roughly four times as much 
wealth as intestate beneficiaries from the inheritances of real property. 
Certainly, the higher-end intestate estates generated significant wealth 
for the beneficiaries, but only four (14%) estates generated inheritances 
of over $100,000 for beneficiaries. On the flip side, twenty-six (62%) of 
the forty-two testate estates generated inheritances of over $100,000 per 
beneficiary. Add that to the fact that testate decedents are nearly twenty 
years older than intestate decedents, and it is a reasonable conclusion 
that the testate heirs are older and better situated financially to leverage 
their newly acquired wealth than their intestate counterparts. 
Thus, in examining the sales data of the combined sixty-eight homes 
that were sold after the decedent’s death, we see some pretty stark 
 
 73 The median value of the intestate homes sold at 90% or more of fair market value 
was $69,333 (about $5,000 lower than the median of all intestate homes being sold) 
and the median value of the testate homes sold at 90% or more of fair market value was 
$175,075 (about $335,000 higher than median of all testate homes being sold). 
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differences. The homes of intestate decedents were overall of lower 
value than those of testate decedents, they were more likely to be sold 
at below fair market value than those of testate decedents, and the 
intestate heirs took significantly smaller inheritances than their testate 
counterparts. There was a small difference in the average length of time 
between death and sale of testate and intestate homes, with testate being 
slightly longer at 3.3 years and intestate sales occurring on average 2.6 
years after death. That small difference, however, could indicate greater 
ability of the testate heirs to hold onto the homes and fix them up prior 
to sale, or hold out for a higher offer than the intestate heirs. The 
difference is too small, however, to indicate significance although it is 
supportive of the larger trend seen here. 
Table 5. Date of Home Sales 
Year Sold Testate Intestate 
2012 3 0 
2013 8 11 
2014 10 4 
2015 5 5 
2016 7 4 
2017 4 1 
2018 4 1 
2019 1 0 
Total 42 26 
Average Time 
Between Death and 
Sale 
3.3 years 2.6 years 
The homes of the testate decedents also tended to be in 
neighborhoods with higher average home values while the homes of the 
intestate decedents were in neighborhoods with lower home values, or 
were located in rural areas of the county with less sales appeal. Factors 
such as housing segregation, zoning, and government investments in 
infrastructure all contribute to the complexity of housing values.74 As 
local governments protect through zoning and real covenants the 
 
 74 See Mitchell, supra note 3, at 852 (discussing the myriad ways in which zoning, 
housing segregation, and other factors affect home values); see also Sheila R. Foster, The 
Limits of Mobility and the Persistence of Urban Inequality, 127 YALE L.J.F. 480, 482-87 
(2017). 
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properties of certain owners and do not protect the property values of 
others, neighborhoods rise and fall with the decisions of city counselors 
who are not thinking about how their decisions might affect the life 
prospects of generations to come. 
Of course, as this data show, there are correlations between wealth 
and rates of testacy and intestacy, but they do not show causation. And 
I certainly do not want to imply that dying testate causes decedents and 
heirs to have greater wealth or to be able to protect their wealth better 
than dying intestate. But the data suggest that dying intestate correlates 
with lower value homes and overall less wealth, which can be lost more 
easily when the property must go through the court-supervised probate 
process. In diving more deeply into the data on these sixty-eight homes 
that were sold, we also see that twenty-five out of twenty-six (96%) of 
the intestate probate petitions listed the real property as an asset of the 
estate requiring probate.75 Only twenty-eight out of forty-two of the 
testate petitions (67%) probated the homes that I examined. This means 
that fully one-third of the testate decedents had titled their real property 
so that it passed directly to beneficiaries, most often through a joint 
tenancy or tenancy by the entirety. Some held the property in trust, and 
then the successor trustee subsequently sold the home after the trust 
settlor’s death. Only one intestate decedent held her home as a joint 
tenant so that it did not need to pass through the probate process to 
have it titled in the names of the heirs.76 
Moreover, twelve — or just under half of the estates of the intestate 
decedents where homes were sold — held no additional property 
besides the homestead requiring probate. This meant that these estates 
had to go through the delay and administrative cost of probate simply 
for the homes owned by these decedents. Fourteen of the twenty-seven 
intestate estates included additional non-homestead property, but much 
of it was of fairly low value. Four indicated that the additional non-
homestead property was worth less than $1,000, and four others 
indicated that the additional non-homestead property was worth less 
than $10,000. Most of this property could have been distributed 
without probate, but was likely included because probate of the real 
 
 75 See infra Table 6. 
 76 See infra Table 6. The fact that most intestate decedents had to probate the real 
estate — while only two-thirds of the testate decedents did — supports the conclusion 
that the median wealth of the testate decedents identified in the probate petitions 
significantly undervalues their total estates. At a bare minimum, for those decedents 
whose homes passed through a non-probate will substitute, the value of those homes 
are not reflected in the overall wealth figures I was able to capture from the probate 
records explored in earlier scholarship. 
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property was going forward anyway and creditors could be barred from 
claims on all probated property after conclusion of administration. Only 
six intestate decedents had additional non-homestead probated 
property worth $20,000 or more.  
The testate estates tell a very different story again. Although only 
twenty-eight of the forty-two testate estates (67%) included the homes 
in the probate petition, at least thirty-three of the forty-two (79%) had 
non-homestead property to be probated in addition to the home. 
Moreover, the total wealth of the testate non-real property was 
$3,873,000 as against the total claimed value of the homestead property 
at $2,244,300. Thus, if we combine the wealth of the testate decedents, 
we see that they probated a combined declared wealth of $6,366,117, of 
which only 39% consisted of the real property homesteads. The 
remaining 61% of the testate wealth was in intangible and tangible 
personal property and some non-residential real property. Intestate 
decedents, on the other hand, probated a combined declared total 
wealth of $2,031,072 of which 71% consisted of the homestead real 
property and only 29% of additional intangible and tangible personal 
property. The table below illustrates the complexity of the two groups 
of probated estates for a fuller picture of the wealth gap between testate 
and intestate decedents. 
Table 6. Real and Personal Property Assets Being Probated 
 Testate Intestate 
Number of Estates that Probated the 
Real Property 
28/42 (67%) 25/26 (96%) 
Total Claimed Value of Real 
Property in Probate Petition 
$2,493,405 $1,448,340 
Adjusted FMV of Same Real 
Property 
$2,771,191 $1,491,751 
Total Additional Non-homestead 
Property 
$3,872,712 $582,732 
Number of Estates with Additional 
Non-homestead Property 
32/42 (76%) 14/26 (54%) 
Average Non-homestead Property 
per Estate 
$121,022 $41,623 
The numbers in the last row of Table 6 supra are just one more piece 
in the rapidly emerging picture of the wealth gap cycle between the 
testate and intestate decedents. While both groups probated a 
significant amount of real property, the intestate decedents had far less 
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additional property requiring probate than the testate decedents. So 
when we compound the effects of the lower value homes, the likelihood 
that they will be sold for lower than fair market value, the less additional 
property in these estates, and the slightly larger number of heirs who 
will divide the inheritances, we see that intestate heirs receive 
inheritances about one-fourth, on average, of what their testate 
counterparts receive. And since all but one intestate estate had to 
probate the real property, there was likely to be a greater delay and some 
cost associated with probate of the real property that did not affect the 
one-third of testate estates in which the real property passed 
automatically at death through a non-probate will substitute. 
C. Foreclosures and Tax Sales 
Perhaps the most shocking results I found were the striking number 
of foreclosures and forfeitures in the records and again, not surprisingly, 
these were heavily concentrated in the intestate estates. These 
foreclosures and tax sales resulted in the home being taken over by the 
bank or mortgage company, and whatever equity the decedent might 
have had in the home was lost to the heirs entirely. But as with the home 
sales, not all foreclosures were the same.77 There appeared to be two 
basic types of foreclosures. The first occurred when the decedent had 
bought the house relatively recently, say between 2000 and 2007, when 
home prices were relatively high, and when they died they had not had 
time to pay off a significant portion of the mortgage.78 Some of these 
homes were bought in 2006 and 2007 and were clearly under water as 
a result of the rapid decline in home values brought on by the 2008 
recession. These homes were like so many that fed the mortgage 
foreclosure crisis that heirs simply gave the homes back to the bank 
rather than try to hold onto them and continue to pay the high 
mortgages until their value rebounded or sell them at a loss. Some 
others involved homes that were purchased perhaps many years earlier, 
but had been refinanced in 2006 or 2007 or for which home equity loans 
had been obtained. Both of these scenarios involved homes with little 
or no equity and foreclosure was probably easier for the successors than 
managing the property or trying to sell it.  
The other type of foreclosure is more problematic, however. These 
were situations in which it appeared the decedent had significant equity 
 
 77 See Mitchell et al., supra note 34, at 601-09. 
 78 Others were bought earlier but the decedent had taken out home equity loans or 
reverse mortgages so that the amount of equity the decedent had in the home was quite 
small. 
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in the home but had not completely paid off the mortgage. These 
foreclosures occurred most likely because the decedent suffered a 
lengthy period of incapacity and no one paid the mortgages or property 
taxes for a year or two. These homes tended to be of lower value, but 
the decedent still had significant equity in them and they were 
auctioned for the property taxes or the remainder of the mortgage which 
tended to be quite low. For these homes, the entire value was lost to the 
heirs because the decedent had owed very little or may have owned the 
home outright but simply failed to pay property taxes. And consistent 
with the sales data, the testate foreclosures tended to be of the first type 
and the intestate foreclosures tended to be of the second type. 
Sadly, 15% (ten of sixty-seven properties) of the intestate homes were 
lost through tax sales and foreclosures, while only 6% (five of eighty-
two properties) of the testate homes were lost. Despite the numbers, 
however, the types of foreclosure were quite different. By examining the 
bank’s bid, the date and amount of the recorded mortgages, the value of 
the property, and the decedent’s date of acquisition, we can begin to 
piece together the unique circumstances of each foreclosure. And even 
though the numbers are quite small, only fifteen homes in all, there are 
patterns that are consistent with the other findings of this study, that 
the real property of intestate decedents is more vulnerable to dissipation 
at the point of intergenerational transfer than the real property of testate 
decedents.  
In five and possibly six of the ten homes owned by intestate decedents 
(F, G, I, L, N & possibly H), there appeared to be only low or modest 
amounts due on mortgages, and the banks acquired the homes on bids 
of roughly half the fair market value or quite less.79 This indicated that 
the heirs lost anywhere from 40-100% of the equity that these decedents 
had built up in these homes. Only one in five of the testate foreclosures 
(B) seemed to indicate a similar substantial loss in equity, although the 
heirs in that case were real estate developers and seemed to be more 
 
 79 F involved a home valued at over $250,000 with a mortgage of $130,000. When 
foreclosed upon in 2014 after the unexpected death of the decedent, the bank bid a mere 
$100 and resold it shortly thereafter for $65,000. The home was quickly renovated and 
sold two years later for $285,000. G was worth roughly $75,000 but was foreclosed on 
in 2011 based on $21,000 left on the mortgage. It was sold by the bank for $26,000 the 
same year as the foreclosure, resulting in loss of significant assets to the three children. 
In L, the amount owed on the mortgage, based on the bank’s bid, was roughly half the 
equity in the home ($52,500 on a home valued at $103,000) and in I the amount owed 
was a little more than half ($41,000 on a home valued at $73,900). And in one 
indeterminate intestate foreclosure (H), the mortgage was higher than the home was 
worth with $224,000 in mortgages on a home valued at only $180,000, but the bank’s 
bid indicates that the decedent may have paid off half the mortgage before death.  
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knowledgeable and perhaps strategic in their decision to allow a 
foreclosure.80 And it is notable that the only tax sale (N) involved a 
home that appeared to be completely paid off, but after the decedent’s 
death the property taxes went unpaid in part because one of the 
decedent’s children was in prison.81 Those heirs lost all the decedent’s 
equity in that home. 
The underwater foreclosures fell differently. Four of the five testate 
foreclosures (A, C, D, E) appeared to be for homes that were purchased 
recently or had extensive outstanding mortgages, only one of which 
appears to have involved any loss of equity.82 Four intestate foreclosures 
(J, K, M, O),83 and possibly five (H), also involved high mortgages or 
 
 80 This home, B, had a fair market value of $186,000, and the bank bid was only 
$63,000. It was then purchased from the bank by a real estate broker in 2017 for 
$156,000 and sold by her two years later for $275,000. By walking away from this home, 
each of the three sons received about $25,000 in tangible and intangible personal 
property from their father’s estate at the time of probate, but gave up an additional 
$200,000 in the lost opportunity to fix up and resell their parents’ homestead. 
Curiously, one of the three sons appears to have been a real estate broker in the area, so 
it is likely that they understood what was going on with the foreclosure. 
 81 The one tax sale involved a home owned by the decedent at her death in 2008. 
She had two children, a son and daughter, but the son was in prison at the time of her 
death. Following her death, her property taxes fell delinquent from 2009 to 2013 when 
the home was sold at tax sale for less than $9,000. Her home had an assessed value of 
$55,000 and a fair market value of $88,500 and she had paid off her mortgage a decade 
earlier in 1998. The entire value of this home appears to have been lost to the heirs.  
 82 Two testate foreclosures were bid upon by the bank for an amount that roughly 
equaled the fair market value (D and E). One had been acquired in 2007, and the other 
had been heavily mortgaged with a long line of home equity loans. And both were later 
sold by the bank for a value lower than the mortgage. And in another foreclosure (A), 
it appeared the mortgages nearly totaled the value of the home, and the bank bid only 
$100, but based on the ten mortgages and lines of credit filed against the home, it is 
likely the decedent had very little equity. The fourth testate mortgage (C) was a 
complicated estate with significant debts in addition to a $128,000 mortgage taken out 
in 2003. The bid by the bank at the foreclosure auction was $75,100 which is probably 
what remained on the 2003 mortgage, even though the house was worth roughly 
$200,000. The bank later sold the home for $156,000. Thus, the heirs may have lost 
roughly $75,000 in equity in the home by allowing the foreclosure.  
 83 J’s case is particularly problematic, as she bought her home in 2002 and paid the 
$40,800 mortgage off entirely in 2008 by taking out an adjustable rate mortgage for 
$118,500 which reflected roughly the entire value of the home at that time. When she 
died in 2011, she stopped making payments on the adjustable-rate mortgage and it was 
foreclosed upon in 2013, at which the mortgage company bid only $49,000 to regain 
the property and then sold it a few months later for $19,900. This was clearly a case of 
a homeowner being caught up in the refinancing frenzy of the real estate bubble. The 
fact that she received a loan for $118,000 is not surprising given that the fair market 
value of nearby homes are in that range today. But assuming she only owed $49,000 at 
the time of the foreclosure, this suggests that she, and her heirs, lost over half the value 
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home purchases at the height of the housing bubble, but these intestate 
foreclosures showed some potential loss of equity nonetheless. 
Although these eight or nine foreclosures represent a majority of the 
total foreclosures, they also are disproportionately distributed. Overall, 
80% (four out of five) of the testate foreclosures resulted in little loss to 
the beneficiaries because the decedents appeared to have had very little 
equity in these homes. These were not the problematic foreclosures. On 
the other hand, only 40% of the intestate foreclosures were of this 
unproblematic type. The following table identifies specific 
characteristics of each of these fifteen forced sales. 
Table 7. Testate and Intestate Foreclosures 
Testate Foreclosures 




















A 7/9/2012 1973 as T/E 106,652 Foreclosure 100 3/2015 85,900 3,049 
B 10/31/201
2 





63,000 12/2014 179,900 90,710 (HS) 
C 6/7/2013 1976 as T/E 201,463 Foreclosure 75,100 5/2016 156,000 81,800 + HS 
D 6/13/09 2007 as T/E 243,446 H x-fer to 
bank in lieu 
of 
foreclosure 
258,000 4/2012 187,500 19,000 
 
of her home, although it is likely the home was hard hit during the recession. In K, the 
decedent acquired his mobile home in 2005 at the height of the market, paying $79,500 
and taking out a mortgage for $78,271. Shortly after his death in 2013 his heirs failed 
to make mortgage payments and the bank foreclosed in 2016, acquiring the property 
for a bid amount of $54,200. Another intestate foreclosure also involved a line of credit 
that was at least as high as the value of the home taken out in 2007 (M) and the home 
was transferred to the mortgage company in lieu of foreclosure where it appears the 
mortgage was close to, if not higher than, the value of the home. And in the last 
foreclosure (O), the decedent had taken out a $100,000 mortgage in 2004, a $74,000 
line of credit in 2005, and another mortgage for $50,000 in 2007 on a home worth 
roughly $180,000. The bank bid only $100,000, however, which may indicate that the 
heirs lost nearly half the value of the home in equity assuming half of the three 
mortgages and lines of credit had been repaid. But the children may not have been able 
to continue paying on the home until the value rebounded enough to sell it and recoup 
any value. The bank, however, turned around and sold the house a few months after 
the foreclosure for $181,000. 
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373,383 Bank acq’d  301,000 5/2014 290,000 30,000 
Intestate Foreclosures 
F 2/14/13 2007 for 
147,000 
264,550 Foreclosure 
in 2014 - 
$131K 
mortgage 
















100 2/2011 26,000 25,000 











8/30/2016 181,000 120,000 




in 2016 lists 






35,100 2016 43,000 85,000 
J 4/8/11 2002 47,800 Foreclosure 49,000 3/19/13 19,900 26,000 
K 7/22/13 2005 64,334 Foreclosure 54,193 7/6/2016 32,500 1,100 




7/6/2017 86,000 150,000 




2011 35,000 Unk 
N 6/27/08 Unknown 88,558 Tax Sale 8,800 9/20/2013 Not sold 7,000 




The mere fact that there were twice as many foreclosures and tax sales 
of intestate properties than testate properties, and that there were 
proportionally more testate real properties, shows that foreclosures hit 
the intestate decedents harder than the testate decedents. Sixteen 
percent of intestate real property-holding decedents lost their homes, 
while only 6% of testate decedents did. And proportionally more of the 
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intestate foreclosures were of the problematic kind in which significant 
amounts of equity were likely lost. Only one (20%) of the testate 
foreclosures seemed to involve significant loss of equity, while five or 
six (50%-60%) of the intestate foreclosures involved significant loss of 
equity, including the tax sale in which all equity was lost for a tax debt 
of less than $9,000. Admittedly, each property is unique, and it matters 
when the decedents acquired their homes, how much equity they had 
in them, and whether their heirs could afford to sell before foreclosure 
happened. Moreover, it also depended on the decedents themselves, and 
whether they had a long decline of incapacity during which no one was 
paying their bills, or whether they had family members or guardians 
who could manage the property to avoid foreclosures. The younger 
average age of intestate decedents also means that their heirs were 
probably in a less economically stable position to take over and pay their 
parent’s debts to avoid loss of equity in these homes.  
IV. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
By focusing in on the subsequent sales and foreclosures or tax sales, 
I have found a sobering pattern in which the lower-value homes of the 
intestate decedents are sold off, often for significantly below fair market 
value, or are at risk of forced sale at double or triple the rates of the 
homes of testate decedents. Intestate decedents had more heirs, leading 
to more fractionation, their real property was more likely to be the only 
reason for going through probate, they had very little other property, 
and they had nearly quadruple the rate of foreclosures. They had done 
far less planning, so there were delays in retitling their property where 
nearly a third of the testate decedents had their real property pass 
smoothly to their survivors without delay. All of these factors 
compound to create a downward wealth cycle for the generally poorer 
intestate decedents and an upward wealth cycle for the generally 
wealthier testate decedents. Although I am not suggesting causation 
here, there is significant correlation between intestacy and less wealth 
— a correlation that prompts us to examine whether there are points of 
intervention, or possible legal and policy changes that might disrupt the 
cycle perhaps at the point when the wealth transfer is happening. 
Although the data set is not large enough to draw large-scale 
conclusions about home values and the likely disposition of intestate 
and testate decedents’ homes, we can see how the wealth gap may be 
exacerbated by intestacy when we consider the size of inheritances and 
their likelihood of fractionation or partition. If we examine the heirs 
and beneficiaries of these estates, we also see the wealth gap problem. 
Intestate decedents had, on average, 2.78 heirs while testate decedents 
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had, on average, 1.8 beneficiaries. The greater the fractionation of the 
intestate estates naturally result in smaller inheritances. 
Further, considering the median age of intestate decedents is nearly 
twenty years younger than their testate counterparts, we can assume 
that their heirs are roughly twenty years younger as well. The larger 
inheritances of the testate beneficiaries come at a point in time when 
their beneficiaries likely don’t need the money and they can put it to the 
benefit of grandchildren, who are likely to be college-aged or older. The 
smaller inheritances of the intestate beneficiaries come at a point in time 
when the beneficiaries themselves are likely to need it for payment of 
debts or living expenses for themselves and their, likely, minor children. 
And $30,000 doesn’t go nearly as far as a $120,000 inheritance, 
especially if the recipient is in a very different economic position and 
can invest rather than spend the money. 
An analysis of the real property records of the intestate and testate 
decedents reveals that the intestate decedents controlled much less 
wealth, and when they owned homes (which they were less likely to 
do), those homes were valued at significantly less than the homes of the 
testate decedents. When they were sold by the survivors, they were 
more likely to be sold at significantly below fair market value, and when 
the heirs received their inheritances, they were substantially less than 
the inheritances of the testate beneficiaries. In considering possible 
interventions to prevent the tax sales and foreclosures, to encourage 
protecting the value of this wealth, and setting up procedures to 
maximize its chance of being leveraged by the beneficiaries to build 
their own wealth, we can easily get quite discouraged. Freedom of 
alienation of property is a fundamental bedrock of our legal system. And 
we certainly cannot insist that grandma’s home be kept in the family 
and passed on for generations as was the custom of our colonial 
forebears. With our global economy and the unprecedented mobility of 
our residents, we cannot assume that children will live even in the same 
state as their parents, will take over their parents’ businesses or homes, 
or will need the inheritance given greater investment in education. With 
greater longevity and more investment in human capital by parents, 
many children don’t need an inheritance and, when they are likely to 
finally get one, they are most likely able to save it. But for many working 
class and minority individuals, the family home may be the only asset 
of significance, and its loss can be devastating to the next generation’s 
ability to scramble up the economic ladder. With the wealth gap 
increasing to its highest point since the 1920s, it is understandable why 
scholars and policymakers are intensely focused on the myriad ways to 
intervene in the downward wealth cycle. 
  
2020] What Happened to Grandma’s House 2637 
There are a few things we can do, both legally and policy-wise, to 
prevent the loss of this wealth. Legally, we can prohibit tax sales and 
foreclosures of property owned by a decedent for a period, perhaps up 
to two years after death. This would give the heirs time to come to grips 
with their loss, sell the home to pay off the mortgage or tax debts, or 
pay off the debts themselves in order to protect the equity in these 
homes. Of course, in two years a home in Florida can easily deteriorate 
with the mildew, weeds, and hurricanes. So someone needs to take an 
interest in these homes. If an heir is not maintaining it with the 
intention of living in it himself or selling it, then perhaps the court could 
appoint a real estate protector who could be given authority to lease the 
house and use the rental income to provide maintenance. If there is no 
heir stepping up, then the real estate protector could perhaps sell the 
home to pay any back debts and ensure that the house is sold for 
maximum value. Like a guardian ad litem, a real property protector 
could be a fiduciary with the task of leveraging real property assets for 
the benefit of heirs. They could be prohibited from selling below a 
certain threshold, like 70% of fair market value, or perhaps they would 
be held to the fiduciary standard of a prudent investor. 
It is unlikely that anyone would recommend that we return to the old 
days of primogeniture when the family estate passed to the eldest son, 
leaving the daughters and younger sons to seek their fortunes through 
marriage, the church, or the army. But creating ways to encourage 
people to make wills, or to use joint tenancies or enhanced life estate 
deeds with their beneficiaries can simplify the transition from one 
generation to the next. Reid Weisbord has suggested that people should 
be able to fill out a simple form will every year when they do their 
taxes.84 If there were a simpler mechanism for enabling homeowners to 
pass their property smoothly outside of probate, that alone would likely 
lessen the chances that the property will be fractionated and sold, or 
lost through foreclosures and tax sales. By encouraging homeowners to 
do even a modest amount of planning before they die, their homes can 
now be passed outside of probate more smoothly and quickly. TOD 
deeds are permissible in twenty-eight states plus the District of 
Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands.85 These deeds allow a landowner 
to simply designate a taker who will receive the property at death, 
retaining for the grantor all power and control to alienate, mortgage, 
and manage during life. At least five states, including Florida, allow the 
 
 84 Reid Kress Weisbord, Wills for Everyone: Helping Individuals Opt Out of Intestacy, 
53 B.C. L. REV. 877, 920 (2012). 
 85 See Wright, Beneficiary Deeds, supra note 33 (manuscript at 2). 
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use of enhanced life estate deeds to effectively accomplish the same 
thing. In my research, I found no decedent who had used one of these 
deeds, although I did see that numerous heirs and beneficiaries did, 
perhaps prompted by their recent experiences with the probate system. 
If these deed forms were made more easily available through the 
property recorder’s office, and if there was more education about their 
use, landowners could ensure that their real property never passes 
through probate. More importantly, landowners could designate a 
single taker to avoid fractionation and ensure better maintenance and 
management of the property. 
There are other things that could help, such as reducing the stigma of 
talking about death and property succession so decedents and their 
heirs can better plan for that fateful day.86 If there were better 
educational programs to inform low-income homeowners of the 
importance of estate planning and of protecting their home equity from 
generation to generation, then perhaps there will be less intestacy. But 
that also means making different options available and informing 
people of their legal implications. Flyers could be included with tax bills 
or mortgage bills encouraging people to make a will and designate who 
should be responsible to maintain the real property in case of incapacity 
and at death. More importantly, if people are not in a position to benefit 
from the non-probate revolution, either because they don’t want to 
make wills or are skeptical of the legal system, then perhaps the probate 
courts could intervene more regularly. A real estate protector program 
for intestate, pro bono probates could help, as could an appointed 
realtor whose job it is to act as a fiduciary for the estate to manage and 
dispose of the real property in the best way possible. It isn’t necessary 
to have snoopy neighbors going through the belongings of the recently 
deceased to identify their assets, but it could be advantageous for people 
below a certain economic threshold to have some professional help 
maneuvering through the probate process. 
There is no question that as people age, their ability to maintain their 
property declines. Homes fall into disrepair, mortgage payments may go 
unpaid in order to pay medical bills, and many elderly people retreat 
from society. Without children and grandchildren checking up and 
ensuring that bills are paid, the house is maintained, and grandma’s 
needs are met, all of her assets become vulnerable to loss and 
destruction. With the loss of those assets, the next generation starts out 
well behind their middle-class peers. We cannot ensure that everyone 
lives to 100, nor can we ensure that everyone will own a well-
 
 86 See Cahn & Ziettlow, supra note 26, at 370.  
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maintained, high-value home at death. But we can make better efforts 
to help ensure that hard-earned wealth is not lost from generation to 
generation. Breaking the wealth-destruction cycle should be a priority 
for a legal system that places property rights and freedom of testation at 
its core. For having property rights should mean having the right to 
have that property protected as it passes from generation to generation 
and not be neglected by our current probate system. 
 
